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Abstract: US strategic approaches in the African Great Lakes region are primarily based on security assistance for training and
equipping African forces for operations in East, North, and West
Africa. This assistance risks causing more incidents of violence. A
new strategy, based on a comprehensive approach to the security
challenges in the region, as well as the deployment of international
“boots on the ground” – American or others – is needed to reduce
violence and to minimize the risk of new terrorist safe havens appearing in central Africa.

O

ne of the main security interests of the United States in Africa is
to counter the violent extremism perpetrated by organizations
such as the al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).1 In order to do so, current
US military strategy aims at training and equipping African forces for
peacekeeping and counterterrorist operations.2 Violent extremism in the
Great Lakes region in central Africa (here understood as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda) is rare;
nonetheless, over the past seven years, the United States has trained tens
of thousands of troops in the region for deployment to other parts of
Africa. Burundi and Uganda, for example, have almost 12,000 troops
currently deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), and Rwanda has more than 3,500 troops deployed in Sudan
as part of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID).
The Great Lakes region is highly unstable and characterized by a
long history of violence, weak governments, a great number of armed
groups, and regional power struggles. The most violent and unstable
state is the DRC, where 7 million people currently require humanitarian
assistance and nearly 2.8 million are internally displaced.3 After three
decades of authoritarian rule and widespread human rights violations
by the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), two
regional wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003), several insurgencies, and
1      Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA,
Commander, United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Posture
Hearing,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2014.
2      This article is only discussing the military efforts and strategies of the United States in Africa.
The United States has, however, a much broader national security strategy. See The White House,
National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015).
3      United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2015/172 (New York: United Nations
Security Council, March 10, 2015), 5.
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perpetual local conflicts, the DRC is currently one of the world’s five
most fragile states.4 The ungoverned territory in the eastern part of the
country is utilized as a safe haven by a variety of domestic and foreign
armed groups, including several from neighboring Burundi, Rwanda,
and Uganda. Over time, conflicts have been fueled across borders, creating an intricate web of violence within the region.
This article argues improving the capacity of the armed forces in this
unstable region to conduct peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations against violent extremists, current US military strategy actually
risks escalating violent conflict in the Great Lakes. Not only would such
an escalation be devastating for the populations living in the region, it
would also be counterproductive for the United States, increasing the
risk that terrorist safe havens will increase in central Africa.
There are two major problems with the current strategic approach.
First, states in the region are fragile, making security cooperation perilous. Second, bilateral approaches in this region, which is characterized
by intricate entanglements, risks disturbing the balance of power and
increasing the risk of violent conflict.
By changing the current US strategy of bilateral security assistance
and small-footprint interventions to one of putting international “boots
on the ground” – American or others – the same amount of US resources
might have more success in countering violent extremists in Africa. The
United States should therefore support a regional intervention, either by
the United Nations or the African Union.

United States in the Great Lakes Region

The United States military strategy in Africa rests on the principle
that “efforts to meet security challenges in Africa is best led and conducted by African partners.”5 The United States thus relies on providing
security assistance and small-footprint interventions. Although the
United States has been militarily engaged in Africa for a long time, the
establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in
2007 represents a reorganization of US efforts in Africa.6 AFRICOM
is the main vehicle for coordinating all US security activities in Africa.
US interests are served by building defense capabilities, responding to
crisis, and deterring and defeating transnational threats through military
operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs. In 2013, for
example, AFRICOM conducted 481 security cooperation activities, 55
operations, and 10 exercises.7
Although AFRICOM is engaged throughout Africa, its immediate priorities are to counter violent extremism and to enhance stability
in East, North, and West Africa respectively.8 Subsequently, US mili4      Kendall Lawrence, “The World’s Ten Most Fragile States in 2014,” Fragile States Index, June 24,
2014, http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-fragile10.
5      Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General David M. Rodriguez,” 5. For an
overview of US security assistance in general, see Andrew J. Shapiro, “A New Era for US Security
Assistance,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Fall 2012).
6      For an overview of the development of AFRICOM, see J. Peter Pham, “The Development
of the United States Africa Command and its Role in America’s Africa Policy under George W. Bush
and Barack Obama,” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 5, no. 3 (2014).
7      Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General David M. Rodriguez,” 3.
8      Ibid., 8-12.
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tary assistance for the countries in the Great Lakes region is primarily
focused on training and equipping African forces for peacekeeping and
counter-terrorism in other parts of Africa. The DRC has received the
largest amount of US military assistance in the region. Since 2007, the
DRC has received almost 120 million dollars.9 The main aim of this
assistance has been to support the reform of the Congolese armed forces
as well as to provide assistance to increase the capacity of the Congolese
army for regional stabilization operations. Funds from Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), and the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) accounts, for
example, have been used to support military advisors to the Congolese
Armed Forces, the deployment of mobile training teams who have provided basic soldier and officer training, and the development of military
strategy and doctrines.10
The US military assistance for Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda has
been more explicitly focused on increasing the armed forces’ ability to
participate in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations in other
parts of Africa. Rwandan armed forces have received almost 15 million
dollars since 2007, primarily used for pre-deployment training for the
deployment in the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation
in Darfur, UNAMID.11 Burundian and Ugandan forces have received
almost 25 million and 28 million dollars, respectively, for pre-deployment training for the African Union Mission in Somalia, as well as
almost 70 million dollars for counter-terrorism training.12 In addition to
the bilateral arrangements with the countries in the Great Lakes region,
the United States has assisted the African Union in operations against
the Ugandan armed group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), in DRC,
Central African Republic and South Sudan since 2011. Around 100 US
military personnel have assisted in strengthening cooperation among
the national militaries of Uganda, CAR, DRC and South Sudan as well
as enhancing their capacity for operational planning. 13
In total, the United States has provided training for almost 28,000
Burundian troops, 27,000 Ugandan troops, and 14,000 Rwandan troops,
9      The amount is calculated from the US Department of Defense and US Department of
State’s Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, for the Fiscal Years of 2007-2013. I have
also included the Peacekeeping Operations account from the US Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, for the Fiscal Years of 2009-2015, in which the ‘actual’ numbers
for year 2007-2013 is presented.
10      See US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, for the Fiscal Years of 20072015; US Department of Defense and US Department of State, Foreign Military Training, for the
Fiscal Years of 2007-2014.
11      For a list over all the courses, see US Department of Defense and US Department of State,
Foreign Military Training, for the Fiscal Years of 2007-2014.
12     US Department of Defense and US Department of State, Foreign Military Training, for the
Fiscal Years of 2007-2014; US Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203(b): Report to
Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Program for Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington, DC: US Department of
Defense, October 2012); US Department of Defense, Section 1209 of the NDAA for FY 2008 (Public
Law 110-181): Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington,
DC: US Department of Defense, May 2013). Note, according to the US Department of Defense
and US Department of State’s joint report, Foreign Military Training, Uganda received 152 million
dollars for counter-terrorism training in 2012, while according to the US Department of Defense
report, Section 1209, it was only around 19 million dollars, for both Uganda and Burundi that year.
13      See for example, US Department of Defense, Section 1209 of the NDAA for FY2008; United
Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2014/42 (New York:
United Nations Security Council, January 23, 2014), 28-29.
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increasing the capacity of their respective armed forces.14 Uganda is currently the largest contributor to AMISOM, with more than 6,000 troops;
Burundi is the second largest contributor to AMISOM, with almost
5,500 troops; and Rwanda has more than 3,500 troops in UNAMID.15
These are important steps towards achieving US aim of denying terrorist
safe havens in East, North, and West Africa.
The Great Lakes region is, however, a problem in and of itself, and
despite several years of US security assistance, it is still highly unstable.
One example is the latest developments in Burundi. In anticipation of
upcoming elections, the country has experienced a failed military coup,
repressed political opposition, and increased violence, which has resulted
in almost 100 killed, 500 wounded, and more than 100,000 refugees.16
Bilateral policies based on security assistance for fragile states to supply
African troops for military operations in other parts of Africa risk destabilizing the Great Lakes region. The escalation of conflict could spark
another regional war, with devastating effects for countries in the region
as well as for US interests in Africa.

Security Assistance for Fragile States

Security assistance and small-footprint interventions are considered
to have many advantages. Most importantly, they increase the political
and military reach of the supported governments as well as reduce political and financial costs compared to a full-scale military intervention.17
Security cooperation with fragile states is, however, notoriously problematic. In some cases, supported armies have overthrown democratically
elected governments. In March 2012, for instance, US-trained Malian
officers undertook a coup which toppled the democratically elected
government. Military coups in Egypt in June 2013, and in Thailand in
May 2014, are two further examples. In other cases, such as, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, Kenya and Mauretania, US-assisted armies have committed
extensive human rights violations. Research suggests security assistance
is especially unsuccessful in achieving desired results if states are fragile.18
Instead of stabilizing the receiving state, military assistance risks
being used by forces supporting insurgents that are committing human
rights violations or restricting democratic processes. First, if the discipline and loyalty of security forces in a supported state is weak, security
assistance risks being channeled to armed groups. Although all states
in the Great Lakes region are more or less fragile, the Congolese armed
forces are especially problematic and are known to support foreign

14      The numbers of trained troops for respective country is taken from the US Department of
Defense and US Department of State’s, Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, for the Fiscal
Years of 2007-2014, including the proposed numbers for 2014.
15      AMISOM, “Burundi,” February 4, 2015, http://amisom-au.org/burundi/; AMISOM,
“Uganda – UPDF,” February 4, 2015, http://amisom-au.org/uganda-updf; Permanent Mission
of Rwanda to the United Nations, “UN Peacekeeping,” February 4, 2015, http://rwandaun.org/
un-peacekeeping.
16      BBC, “Burundi Vice-President Gervais Rufyikiri Flees,” BBC, June 25, 2015, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-33267428.
17      See for example, Shapiro, “A New Era for US Security Assistance.”
18      Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military
Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia,” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (January 2015); Michael J.
McNerney, et al., Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014);
Stephen Watts, et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding US Small-Footprint Interventions in Local
Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014).
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armed groups on their territory. They were extensively collaborating
with Rwandan and Burundian insurgents during both regional wars in
1996-1997 and 1998-2003, even incorporating Rwandan insurgents into
their ranks. Despite the establishment of a new military organization
in 2003 – the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(FARDC) – and continuing military reforms, some commanders have
sustained their support for Rwandan insurgents, selling weapons and
supplies, as well as conducting operations together against Congolese
armed groups.19
Other Congolese commanders support Congolese armed groups.
The integration of former insurgents into the army, as part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs and security-sector
reform, has created whole battalions with stronger ties to Congolese
armed groups than to the government, facilitating defection and collaboration between the army and the insurgents.20 In 2012, for instance,
several commanders defected from FARDC and established a new
Congolese armed group, the M23. Assistance for the Congolese armed
forces could end up supporting one or more of the insurgent groups currently residing on Congolese territory, increasing rather than decreasing
the instability in the region.
Second, security forces in fragile states often have poor human
rights records, and assistance for such forces risks benefiting troops
who commit atrocities. Once again, the Congolese armed forces stand
out, having been highly criticized for their lack of discipline, and for
their ruthlessness against civilians, including rape and mass atrocities.21
One of the main US military efforts in DRC so far, the establishment
and training of the 391st Commando Battalion, clearly illustrates this
challenge. In 2010, US Special Forces trained a light infantry battalion
of about 750 troops who were to become part of the Congolese army’s
new rapid reaction force. The battalion was also intended to be a model
for future reforms within the FARDC.22 However, in November 2012,
during military operations against the Congolese armed group M23, the
battalion took part in raping around 130 women and girls.23 Burundian
and Ugandan troops are also known for human rights violations,
although on a smaller scale. Recently, both Burundian and Ugandan
AMISOM troops have been accused of raping women in Somalia.24
19      See for example, United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 22 January 2014, 24.
20      For an overview of the development of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (FARDC), see Colin Robinson, “Army Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 2003-2009,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (July 2012); and Maria Eriksson Baaz and
Judith Verweijen, “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and
Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC,” African Affairs 112, no. 449 (October 2013).
21      See for example, United Nations, Progress and Obstacles in the Fight against Impunity for Sexual
Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: United Nations, April 2014); and United
Nations, Report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by
Soldiers of the Congolese Armed Forces and Combatants of the M23 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu Province,
and in and around Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to 2 December 2012 (New York: United
Nations, May, 2013).
22     US Africa Command, “750 Congolese Soldiers Graduate from US-Led Military Training,
Form Light Infantry Battalion,” September 20, 2010, http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/
Article/7727/750-congolese-soldiers-graduate-from-us-led-milita.
23      Craig Whitlock, “US-Trained Congolese Troops Committed Rapes and Other Atrocities, UN
Says,” The Washington Post, May 13, 2013; and United Nations, Report of the United Nations Joint Human
Rights Office on Human Rights Violations.
24      Human Rights Watch, The Power these Men Have Over Us: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African
Union Forces in Somalia (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2014).
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Last, governments of fragile states are often repressive against their
political opposition in order to stay in power, and the increased capacity of security forces assisted by a third party could be utilized in this
regard. All governments in the region have been more or less repressive.
According to several sources, Rwanda is well known for “being run
by a dictatorship with little respect for human rights.”25 Furthermore,
repression by both the Congolese and Burundian governments is currently increasing in anticipation of upcoming elections in 2015. During
demonstrations against the Congolese government’s plan to revise the
electoral law in January this year, around 500 individuals, many from the
opposition, were arrested, and more than 20 people were killed by security forces.26 The Burundian government has recently opted to change
the constitution in order to stay in power, and has imposed restrictions
on freedom of speech; it has also distributed weapons to its youth wing
(the Imbonerakure), and intimidated, imprisoned and killed candidates
of the opposition.27 The repressive use of security forces by these governments against their own populations, contributes to insecurity in the
region.

Bilateral Arrangements for Regional Dynamics

US military strategy in the Great Lakes relies on multiple bilateral
agreements, which is highly problematic in a region defined by profound
regional entanglements. The Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments have, for example, all supported Congolese armed groups.
During the two regional wars, all three governments fought on the
side of the Congolese insurgents against the Congolese government.
Rwanda and Uganda also occupied large parts of eastern and northern
DRC during the second war. Furthermore, contemporary Burundian,
Rwandan, and Ugandan armed groups have been utilizing Congolese
territory since the 1990s, provoking relations between the governments,
and each of the corresponding governments have used the armed groups
as an excuse to intervene militarily in the DRC, with or without the
Congolese government’s approval.28
Tensions between the Congolese government on the one side,
and the Rwandan and Ugandan governments on the other are still
pronounced. The continuing presence of both Rwandan and Ugandan
armed groups on Congolese territory is at the heart of the problem.
Although the number of insurgents is much smaller than previously
(between 1,500 and 2,000 Rwandan insurgents and no more than 2,000
Ugandan insurgents) they are still causing cross-border incidents.29
Congo has recently accused Rwanda and Uganda of supporting the
Congolese armed group M23, and according to the UN Group of
Experts final report in 2014, Rwanda has been especially active. Among

25      Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World:
Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Affairs 110, no. 438 (January 2011).
26      United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2015/172 (New York: United Nations
Security Council, March 10, 2015), 2.
27      United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in
Burundi, S/2014/550 (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2014), 8-9.
28      For an overview of the region between 1996 and 2006, see Filip Reyntjens, The Great African
War: Congo and Regional Politics, 1996-2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
29      Interview, MONUSCO official, Goma, DRC, October 12-17, 2014; and United Nations
Security Council, Letter Dated 22 January 2014, 19, 28.
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other things, it has been recruiting fighters and providing arms and
ammunition for the Congolese insurgents. During periods of heavy
fighting in 2013, Rwandan armed forces were reinforcing the M23 with
troops as well as tanks on Congolese territory. In June 2014, new accusations of cross-border fighting occurred between Rwanda and DRC.30
Since the beginning of 2015, when a deadline for the disarmament
of the Rwandan armed group the FDLR in DRC was ignored by the
group, the Rwandan President Paul Kagame also voiced his increasing
dissatisfaction with the inaction of the Congolese armed forces and the
international community in pursuing the FDLR.31
Since the main party of the current Burundian government – the
CNDD-FDD – was a Burundian armed group fighting together with
the Congolese government during the second regional war, and the
number of Burundian insurgents on Congolese territory is small, the
relations between the two governments are much more favorable. The
mounting tensions and increasing turmoil in anticipation of upcoming
elections in Burundi have, however, contributed to the increased number
of Burundian actors on Congolese territory. Both the opposition and the
youth wing of the ruling party (the Imbonerakure) are using ungoverned
territory in eastern DRC to prepare for war if the outcome of the election
is not favorable.32 This development could jeopardize current relations
between the Congolese and Burundian governments. If it follows previous patterns, the increased presence of Burundian insurgents and armed
forces on Congolese territory could also contribute to intensified hostility between groups at the local level, increasing the risk of violence in
eastern DRC.
Although the support for Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan
armed forces is small from a US perspective (only around 150 million
dollars since 2007) it is important for countries in the region. According
to the Department of Defense and Department of State’s Joint Report
to Congress on Foreign Military Training, almost 28,000 Burundian
troops, 27,000 Ugandan troops and 14,000 Rwandan troops have been
trained by the United States over the last ten years. This is a significant
contribution considering the number of active forces in each country:
20,000 in Burundi, 45,000 in Uganda and 33,000 in Rwanda.33 Although
the number of forces is stable, their ability to use force has been
enhanced: some forces have attended courses in peacekeeping logistics
or basic fighting skills, while others have been trained in counter-terrorism and urban warfare by the US Marines. Considering the uneasy
relation between the states in the region, this contribution could easily
tip the delicate balance between the states, and if there is a disagreement
30      United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 22 January 2014, 10-12; and France24, “Second
Day of Fighting on Border between Rwanda and DRC,” June 12, 2014, http://www.france24.com/
en/20140612-second-day-fighting-rwanda-democratic-republic-congo-border/.
31      Edmund Kagire, “Paul Kagame Complains of Inaction on Rwandan Rebels in DRC…
Again,” The East African, April 7, 2015, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-citesdouble-standards-in-failure-to-deal-with-FDLR/-/2558/2678444/-/blu9dvz/-/index.html.
32      Interviews, NGO staff and MUNUSCO official, Bukavu, DRC, October 1-12, 2014.
33      The numbers of trained troops for respective country is taken from the US Department of
Defense and US Department of State’s Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, for the Fiscal
Years of 2007-2014, including the proposed numbers for 2014. The numbers of active force for
respective country is taken from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance:
The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics 2015 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2015).
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between the states, they are all better equipped to pursue their own
agendas with military means.

Rethinking US Strategy in the Region

If current US strategy risks conflict escalation in the Great Lakes
region, thereby decreasing the prospects for countering violent extremism in Africa, is there a better approach? More importantly, could
another strategy increase prospects for achieving US goals in Africa,
without increasing costs?
The core problem for stability in the Great Lakes region is undoubtedly eastern DRC with its ungoverned territory utilized as a safe haven by
a multitude of domestic and foreign armed groups. The porous borders
between the countries further add to suspicion between governments.
According to several researchers, large-scale military interventions
decrease the security dilemma between belligerents, and increases the
chances of peace.34 Previous research also indicates that international
forces are highly important for preventing conflicts from spreading
across borders.35 International forces can decrease suspicion between
governments concerning cross-border support for each other’s armed
groups and prevent government forces from intervening in neighboring
states. Furthermore, international troops could also decrease the risk
that military assistance will be used by indigenous forces to support
insurgents, commit human rights violations, and restrict democratic
processes.
If a large-scale military intervention could increase the trust between
the states in the region, the United States would certainly be more successful in achieving its military objectives in Africa. There are mainly
three ways this could be achieved, each with its own costs and benefits.
First, the United States could launch a large-scale unilateral or coalition
military intervention. The United States already has a small military
presence in the region. In addition, AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa has established its operational headquarters in
Djibouti, not too far from the Great Lakes region. Close cooperation
with the armed forces in the region would be important in establishing
good relations with host nations, and increasing prospects for success.
However, a US military intervention in central Africa could be costly;
indeed, much more costly than current efforts. Since US security interests in the region do not enjoy a high priority, this solution would not
be politically viable.
Second, the United States could increase its support for UN operations in the Great Lakes region by supporting a large-scale intervention.
The only UN operation currently deployed in the region is the UN
mission in DRC (MONUSCO) with about 22,000 troops, including the
so-called Force Intervention Brigade. The Force Intervention Brigade is
a recent addition of about 3,000 troops and has a more forceful mandate
34      See for example, Hultman, et al., “United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection
in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 4 (October 2013); Andrea Ruggeri, et al.,
“Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 57, no. 3 (June 2013); and Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement
of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
35      Kyle Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict,” The Journal of Politics
73, no. 4 (October 2011).
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than the rest of MONUSCO. It has recently been quite successful. In
2013, it helped the Congolese armed forces defeat the rebel group M23.
It has also targeted Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan armed groups
located in the DRC.36 The UN mission has, however, been deployed
since 1997 without achieving its goals. Increased support from the
United States for the UN mission, both in terms of materiel and personnel, as well as knowledge, could greatly increase its effectiveness. The
current US military assistance for the region is about 55 million dollars
per year. This amount equals almost 10 percent of the total budget for
MONUSCO’s military and police personnel costs in 2014, making a
change in US strategy highly desirable for the UN mission.37 Acceptance
for the United Nations in the region is, however, decreasing. In 2014,
the UN political mission in Burundi was withdrawn at the request of the
Burundian government, and in 2015, the government of DRC requested
a withdrawal of the UN mission in DRC. Furthermore, there are no
current UN operations in Burundi, Rwanda, or Uganda, making the
regional aspects of the power dynamics difficult to address with a UN
mission.
Last, the United States could also support an increased presence of
African Union forces in the Great Lakes. The AU is currently conducting one operation in the region, with support from the United States.
It is a regional operation deployed in DRC, Central African Republic,
and South Sudan against a Ugandan armed group, the LRA. Although
the effectiveness of regional organizations for peacekeeping and peacemaking is still debated, regional organizations are indeed taking more
responsibility for peace operations.38 An increased presence of AU
troops in the region would follow the current US approach of African
solutions for African problems.39 It would also be a cheaper option than
deploying American troops on the ground while being politically more
viable than increasing the UN presence in the region. If building on the
current AU approach of cross-border operations against the Ugandan
armed group, an increased responsibility for the AU in the Great Lakes
region might also increase prospects for the deployment of forces across
borders.
The African Union is, however, still developing its peacekeeping and
counterinsurgency capabilities, and it is criticized for having ill-trained
and ill-equipped armies, as well as underfunded operations.40 Its troops
are also repeatedly accused of committing human rights violations.41
Furthermore, the deployment of a large AU military intervention in the
36      For the latest developments, see United Nation Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2015/172
(New York: United Nation Security Council, 2015).
37      The amount of US military assistance is calculated between the years of 2009 and 2013, and
taken from the US Department of Defense and IS Department of State’s Foreign Military Training:
Joint Report to Congress, for the Fiscal Years of 2009-2014. The cost of MONUSCO personnel is taken
from United Nations General Assembly, Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from
1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, A/C.5/68/21 (New York: United Nations, January 23, 2014).
38      See, for example, Laurie Nathan, The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organisations,
(London, UK: Crisis States Research Center, 2010).
39      The United States is providing military assistance for developing the AUs peacekeeping
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Great Lakes region risks increasing regional tensions instead of decreasing them, depending on which countries provide troops for the mission.
The African Union Regional Task Force (RTF) is one example of the
risks of deploying an AU mission. It was established in 2012 in order to
pursue the LRA. The main troop contributor to the RTF is Uganda,
with additional forces from DRC, South Sudan and CAR. On the one
hand, the cooperation between different states across borders contributes greatly to stabilization in the region and to the elimination of the
LRA. On the other hand, cross-border movements of the RTF’s armed
forces in pursuit of the LRA have caused intense accusations between
neighbors, and since the establishment of the RTF, the Congolese government has accused Ugandan armed forces of repeated unauthorized
incursions.

Conclusion

Currently, US policy in Africa is focused on preventing safe havens
for terrorist organizations in the northern parts of Africa. Security
assistance for the states in the Great Lakes region is primarily intended
to train and equip forces for peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations elsewhere. However, the Great Lakes region is unstable, with fragile
states, active armed groups, and a precarious regional power balance.
Furthermore, in anticipation of upcoming elections in 2015, both the
Congolese and Burundian governments have increased repressive measures against their political opposition, escalating tensions in the region.
Considering the complexity of state relations within the Great Lakes
region, it is clear the current US strategic approach risks contributing to
the escalation of the conflicts and tensions rather than decreasing them,
and that another strategy is desirable. Although a full-scale US military
intervention would be costly, and nearly impossible because of political
realities, increased US support for UN or AU operations in the region
could be a solution. By converting current bilateral security assistance
programs into a comprehensive regional effort for providing either UN
or AU “boots on the ground,” the regional power balance could be more
easily managed, decreasing the risk of destabilization. By supporting a
regional solution, with a substantial number of international forces on
the ground, instead of bilateral small-footprint interventions and security assistance programs, the history of security assistance for countries
in the Great Lakes region—such as France’s support for the former
Rwandan government—can avoid being repeated, and the likelihood of
genocide and regional wars reduced.

